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Issue I

COURT REPORTS

Second, whether under the CWA, the unlined brine pond constituted
a point source. Finally, whether this type of pollutant discharge was
within the scope of federal Clean Water Act citizen suitjurisdiction.
The court concluded that all groundwater, including groundwater
hydrologically connected to surface water, was not subject to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permitting
program. The legislative history indicated that Congress did not intend to regulate groundwater when it enacted the CWA. The CWA
states explicitly when it applies to groundwater, and clearly differentiates "navigable waters" from "ground waters." Furthermore, the EPA
has not formally interpreted the CWA to include groundwater.
In addition, the court recognized a practical consequence to subjecting groundwater to the NPDES permit system. Oregon law requires a specific permit for discharges into groundwater that is different than an NDPES permit. Thus, the court was concerned that
people would be subject to increased liability if they misjudged the
type of permit they needed.
Although the other two issues were rendered moot after determination of the preliminary issue, the court offered resolution of these
issues so that the ninth circuit would have a full opinion to review. In
resolving the second issue, the court deemed the brine pond a point
source because it was easily identifiable as a single source discharging
pollutants.
Finally, the court determined that jurisdiction was proper in this
case. The CWA only allows citizen suit jurisdiction for current violations, not those that are in the past and from which there is no risk of
further violation. In the instant case, pollutants were no longer added
to the brine pond, yet they continued to escape from it. Thus, the
court held that because pollutants continued to reach navigable waters
there was an ongoing violation of the CWA, and therefore, jurisdiction
was proper.
Shana Smilovits

ALASKA
State of Alaska v. Marie Arnariak v. Adam Arnariak, 941 P.2d 154
(Alaska 1997) (determining that the Marine Mammals Protection Act
did not preempt state law regulating the taking of marine mammals
within the Walrus Islands State Game Sanctuary).
The Alaska Supreme Court found the federal Marine Mammals
Protection Act ("MMPA") did not preempt state regulations controlling the taking of marine mammals within a state game sanctuary. The
court found that such preemption would violate the Fifth Amendment's takings clause.
The purpose of the MMPA is to protect marine mammals to the
greatest possible extent. It seeks to prohibit the harassment, catching,
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and hunting of marine mammals and to protect their populations
from endangerment by humans. It protects essential habitats, rookeries, and similar mating grounds from the adverse effects of human
contact and activities.
Under Alaskan regulation, no one may enter the Round Island
sanctuary (part of the Walrus Islands State Game Sanctuary) without a
permit, and permitted visitors are prohibited from discharging firearms within the park. Visitation to Round Island is very limited-only
thirty persons per day are allowed during the peak season. Mrs. Arnariak was charged in this case with violating the first regulation, by
failing to obtain a permit to enter the park. The state charged Mr. Arnariak with violating the second regulation for discharging a firearm
while hunting walrus on the island.
The Arnariaks moved for dismissal, arguing that the regulations
they had allegedly violated were preempted by the MMPA. Specifically, the Act prohibits the taking of marine mammals, and prohibits
the enforcement of any state law regarding such takings. Crucial to
the Arnariaks' defense was an exemption in the Act for the harvesting
of mammals by Alaskan Natives for certain defined purposes. Among
the enumerated purposes are takings for subsistence, and takings for
creating and selling authentic native handicrafts and clothing. The
Arnariaks argued that because they are Native Alaskans, this exemption applied and that federal law preempted the state regulations.
After finding the MMPA preempted the state regulations and that
the respondents were protected under the Act's exemptions for Native
Alaskans, the trial court granted the respondents' motion to dismiss.
The appellate court affirmed the holding. The Alaska Supreme Court
reversed and remanded for a new trial on their findings.
The Alaska Supreme Court decided that the State of Alaska, the
Petitioner, had the right to exclude entry to its property and to prohibit the discharge of firearms therein. It found that prohibiting the
state's freedom to control the behavior of visitors to the Walrus Islands
State Game Sanctuary would constitute a taking, requiring compensation from the federal government. Interpreting the Fifth Amendment,
the court found it protects the states from federal government takings
as it does United States citizens. Typically, federal statutes are construed in a manner to avoid the risk of unconstitutionality if reasonable. If the MMPA was construed to preempt state law it would have
created an uncompensated taking of state property-the walruses.
Since the MMPA could reasonably be construed not to preempt state
law, avoiding the taking, the court interpreted it accordingly.
Noting the devastating effects to walrus habitat and population in
the absence of such state regulations, the Alaska Supreme Court found
it unlikely that Congress intended the Act to interfere with a state's efforts to maintain a walrus sanctuary. The court, after finding the state
regulations garnered similar results to those intended by the MMPA,
decided preemption was improvident. Supporting this conclusion is
the presumption of statutory construction against finding federal pre-
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emption in areas traditionally regulated by the states. Regulation of a
state's lands typically falls within the traditional functions of the state.
As state regulation is not preempted by the MMPA, the state is capable of restricting visitation and prohibiting hunting by Native Alaskans. Withoutjust compensation, the court concluded that a proscription of these state freedoms would be unconstitutional, violating the
Fifth Amendment, and thus construed the MMPA not to preempt state
law.
Chip Cuter

Kelso v. Rybachek, 912 P.2d 536 (Alaska 1996) (holding that the State
is not required to support its decision not to downgrade water uses
and was reasonable in its adoption of regulations governing reclassification of water).
On January 31, 1983, the Livengood/Tolovana Mining District
("Miners") applied to the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (the "Department") to reclassify streams for industrial uses,
thus lowering the classification standards for the streams. The Department denied the petition. The Environmental Protection Agency,
however, had revised its regulations requiring a State to perform a use
attainability analysis ("UAA") before reclassifying waters to eliminate
assigned uses.
The Miners appealed the denial of reclassification to the superior
court. The court held that pursuant to the new federal guidelines,
"prior to any reclassification the State must conduct a [UAA] and must
have appropriate regulations for the conducting of such analysis." The
court ordered the Department to promulgate appropriate regulations
and conduct a UAA on the waters that the Miners had petitioned.
The Department complied with the court order and enacted regulations that required at least one hearing and compliance with federal
reclassification regulations before any reclassification of state waters.
The Department then proceeded to conduct a UAA on the waters the
Miners had petitioned for reclassification. The Department conducted field surveys, water quality analyses, habitat observation, and
biological surveys. On three streams, the Department found that attainability was inconclusive because of lack of information. Where
they found suitable fish habitat but did not actually observe fish during
the study, fish use was deemed attainable. The Department then determined that the streams had, "'existing' and 'attainable' uses requiring more stringent controls than the industrial classification." Furthermore, the Department conducted public hearings on the
reclassification of the water. Based upon the UAA and the hearings,
the Department made a final decision on the reclassification of the waters and submitted it to the Department of Law. The Department of
Law made further revisions and subsequently submitted it to the Lieutenant Governor's office. On January 9, 1990, the final decision was

